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ABSTRACT Device-to-device (D2D) communications have shown a huge potential in cellular offloading
and become a potential technology in 5G and beyond. In D2D networks, the requested contents by user
devices (UDs) can be delivered via D2D links, thus offloading the content providers (CPs). In this work,
we address the problem of minimizing the delay of delivering content in a decentralized and partially D2D
connected network using network coding (NC) and cooperation among the UDs. The proposed optimization
framework considers UDs’ acquired and missing contents, their limited coverage zones, NC, and content’s
erasure probability. As such, the completion time for delivering all missing contents to all UDs is minimized.
The problem is modeled as a coalition game with cooperative-players wherein the payoff function is derived
so that increasing individual payoff results in the desired cooperative behavior. Given the intractability of
the formulation, the coalition game is relaxed to a coalition formation game (CFG). A distributed coalition
formation algorithm relying on merge-and-split rules is developed for solving the relaxed problem at each
transmission. The effectiveness of the proposed solution is validated through computer simulation against
existing schemes.
INDEX TERMS Coalition game, content delivery, device-to-device networks, instantly decodable network
coding, multimedia streaming, real-time applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
The use of smartphones and data-hungry applications in
radio access networks are increasing dramatically worldwide.
This growth impacts the ability of traditional wireless net-
works to meet the required Quality-of-Service (QoS) for its
user devices (UDs). Device-to-device (D2D) communication,
as one of the candidate technologies for 5G and beyond [1],
[2], supports a massive number of connected devices and
possibly improves the data-rate without fixed infrastructure
for content delivery [3], [4]. The decentralized nature of
D2D networks allows devices to communicate with other
nearby devices via D2D links, which is suitable for numerous
applications in mobile networks. For example, in wireless
cellular networks, a D2D system enables cellular offloading
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Keivan Navaie .
by cooperation among UDs for content downloading and
sharing.
The report provided by Cisco [5] shows that most of the
wireless data contents are mainly distributed in hotspot areas,
such as a playground, public transport, a conference hall.
In such hotspots, there is a tremendous high UD density and
UDs request high volume of data traffic. As such, it causes
network congestion and interruption at UDs. Actually, it is
noticed that some UDs tend to have a common interest in
downloading the same content, known as popular content.
This frequently happens where UDs download a popular
application, an electronic map, or streaming multimedia con-
tents, such as videos. This consumes a huge amount of cel-
lular system resources [6]. Therefore, D2D communication
technique can be exploited to distribute the popular content
as such to offload the centralized content providers (CPs)
and reduce network congestion in the cellular networks. For
instance, consider that a content consists of set of packets
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p1, p2, and p3 is requested by set of UDs u1, u2, and u3.
Suppose that the CP transmitted the requested contents to the
UDs and due to channel impairments UD ui did not receive
packet pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Traditionally, these lost packets
are retransmitted repeatedly from the CP to each UD until
all UDs receive them correctly. As a result, the CP needs at
least 3 uncoded transmissions for delivering these packets,
which degrade system performance [7]. However, UDs can be
either packet holders that can provide their received packets to
other UDs or packet requesters that can receive the requested
packets from other UDs. In our considered example, the
u1-th UD holds packets p2 and p3, and accordingly, it can
transmit binary XOR1 combination p2 ⊕ p3 to the u2-th and
u3-th UDs. Then, the u2-th UD holds p1 and can provide it
to the u1-th UD. As a result, 2 transmissions are required
for delivering all packets to all UDs. Therefore, D2D tech-
niques can be used with binary XOR combination to combine
contents and transmit them to interested UDs via D2D links.
As a result, the number of transmission slots is minimized
and the CP’s resources are offloaded. As another example,
consider that a popular video content representing a frame of
packets. Assume that UDs have already received some pack-
ets and requested some other packets from that frame. For
continuously streaming that video without any interruption,
UDs should receive their requested packets with minimum
number of transmissions. For such a case, UDs can XOR
the previously received packets and cooperate among them to
progressively deliver requested packets to all requesting UDs
with the minimum number of D2D transmissions. Such UDs
cooperation and progressive packet decoding at the UDsmeet
the delay requirements and ensure good streaming quality.
Joint content distribution and resource allocation prob-
lem has been considered in different works, see for
example, [31], [32]. In particular, the authors of [31] devel-
oped a novel framework that takes UD-centric informa-
tion, such as content distribution and mobility patterns, into
account to effectively deploy flying cache-enabled remote
radio heads (RRHs). As such, UDs’ quality-of-experience
(QoE) in cloud radio access network (CRAN) is maximized.
In [32], the authors solved the joint caching and resource
allocation problem for a network of cache-enabled unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). As such, the number of stable queue
UDs is maximized. However, the aforementioned works did
not consider the problem of delivering a set of requested
contents to a set of requesting UDs by exploiting both XOR
combinations of UDs’ requests and UDs cooperation over
D2D links. In this work, we are interested in the content
delivery problem in partially connected D2D networks where
the aim is to minimize the number of D2D transmissions that
are required to deliver all requested contents to all UDs. This
problem is usually referred as the completion time minimiza-
tion problem.
The completion time minimization problem was solved
in different network settings for various applications. For
1The ‘‘XOR’’ term in this work is referred to the bit-wise Exclusive OR.
example, Raptor codes [8] and Random Linear Network
Codes (RLNC) [9] addressed the problem and achieved
maximum network throughput. However, they are not suit-
able techniques for delivering delay-sensitive contents for
real-time applications, such as online gaming, and telecon-
ferencing. Actually, they accumulate a substantial decoding
delay, meaning that these codes do not allow progressive
decoding. In particular, combined contents cannot be decoded
to retrieve the original data until enough number of indepen-
dent transmissions are received. On the other hand, a low-
complexity solution, called Instantly Decodable Network
Coding (IDNC), improves throughput while allowing pro-
gressive decoding of the received contents [10]. By relying
solely on binary XOR operations, IDNC ensures fast and
instantaneous decodability of the transmitted contents for
their intended UDs. Therefore, IDNC has been the topic of
extensive research, see for example, [11]–[17]. It has been
applied in several real-time broadcast applications wherein
received contents need to be used at the application layer
immediately to maintain a certain QoS, e.g., relay-aided
networks [18], video-on-demand and multimedia streaming
[19]–[25], and D2D-enabled systems [26]–[30].
The aforementioned IDNC works, for both fixed infras-
tructures and D2D networks, are centralized in the sense that
they require a central cloud to plan XOR combinations and
coordinate transmissions. For example, the authors of [29]
considered the completion time minimization problem in a
partially connected D2D fog radio access network (FRAN).
The problemwas solved by optimization with the assumption
that the fog is within the transmission range of all UDs and
has perfect knowledge of the network topology. Accordingly,
the fog selects transmitting UDs and their XOR combina-
tions and conveys the information to the UDs for execution.
The above mentioned centralized approaches provide good
performance for the decentralized system, but they bring
significant challenges to the system. First, they require high
computation cost at the fog units and high power consumption
at each UD. Indeed, UDs need to send the status of all D2D
channels to the fog after each transmission. Second, the fog
requires to know the downloading history of UDs for content
delivery. Recently, in [33], [34], a non-cooperative game was
used to reduce the completion time for content reception.
Still, the authors just considered a fully connected scenario
that only one player transmits the contents in each transmis-
sion slot. The fully connected model is ideal in the sense that
all players are connected, and each player makes its decisions
individually and selfishly. Thus, it ignored the cooperative
and altruistic decisions of players to further minimize the
delay for delivering the contents [35].
The cooperative and altruistic decisions of players have
shown the potential of coalition games in optimizing different
parameters in different models [36]–[40]. For example, the
tutorial in [36] classified the coalition games and demon-
strated the applications of coalition games in communica-
tion networks. The authors of [37] proposed a distributed
game-theoretical scheme for players cooperation in wireless
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networks to maximize the sum-rate. In [40], the authors
recommended that UDs can cooperatively receive the same
content through multi-hop D2D communications. However,
the aforementioned works are agnostic to the available side
information at the network layer, i.e., requested and previ-
ously received contents by different UDs. As a result, each
UD sends uncoded (i.e., without network coding) content that
serves a single UD. Such side information can be exploited to
efficiently select a combination of contents that can benefit a
subset of interested UDs.
In addition to their investigations in uncoded existing
works, coalition games for network coding-enabled networks
have been extensively explored from various perspectives.
Prior network coding works with coalition games aimed to
maximize sum-rate, see the works in [41], [42]. In particular,
the authors of [42] showed the potential of network coding
in maximizing the sum-rate in network coding-aided D2D
communication. Moreover, some prior works analyzed the
problem of content dissemination when network coding is
enabled, e.g., [43], [44]. The authors of [43] presented an effi-
cient non-cooperative game theoretic scheme for content dis-
semination using RLNC. However, the above related works
[43], [44] used RLNC for content dissemination. As pre-
viously mentioned, RLNC is not a suitable technique for
delivering delay-sensitive contents for real-time applications
of interest in this work. Recently, the authors of [45] proposed
a coalition game framework for packet delivery reduction in
a partially connected D2D network using IDNC. However,
the authors assumed that the cluster head selection is pre-
determined. Moreover, all clusters are formed once at the
beginning of recovery phase. This does not give flexibility
to UDs to choose their own groups in the next transmission.
Importantly, if no available packets in any cluster, UDs in that
cluster have to stop their intra-cluster recovery phase and wait
for their cluster head to perform the inter-cluster recovery
phase. This results in prolonged packet delivery time. To this
end, we consider a more general setting in which a decentral-
ized and distributed framework is developed to: i) derive the
rules for optimizing the selection of the transmitting player
in each formed coalition, and ii) give flexibility to UDs to
choose their own alliances at each transmission. As such,
all packets are delivered to all UDs in only intra-coalition
delivery phase with minimum completion time.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Motivated by the above limitations of the existing works, our
work considers partially connected D2D networks compris-
ing several single-antenna UDs distributed in a local hotspot,
and each UD is partially connected to other UDs. The com-
pletion time minimization problem is motivated by real-time
applications that tolerate only small latency. In such applica-
tions, the contents, represented by a frame of packets, need to
be delivered to UDs via D2D links with the minimum number
of D2D transmissions. Our proposed model can be applied
in different applications. For example, UDs at the edge of
the service area or in dense urban areas often experience
content losses from CPs due to channel impairments. Our
proposed distributed scheme can be used to serve these UDs
via D2D links. Moreover, in cell centers with low erasures,
our proposed scheme has the potential to offload the CP’s
resources, e.g., time, bandwidth, and the ability to serve more
UDs. The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows.
1) For partially connected D2D networks, we develop
a decentralize IDNC-assisted D2D game theoretical
framework to minimize the completion time while
offloading the CPs. In particular, the completion time
minimization problem is formulated and modeled as a
coalition game. Given the difficulty of expressing the
problem as a coalition game with non-transfer func-
tion (NTU), we relax it to a coalition formation game
(CFG).
2) In the relaxed CFG, the completion time metric is
written as the utility function, which is transferred to
each player’s2 payoff in each coalition. We derive the
rules for associating players, selecting the transmit-
ting player, and finding its packet combination that is
beneficial for a set of interested UDs in each disjoint
altruistic coalition. Afterward, we develop a coalition
formation distributed algorithm in each transmission
slot based on merge-and-split rules.
3) The proposed coalition formation algorithm is proved
to converge to a Nash-stable equilibrium, and its com-
plexity and communication overhead are analyzed the-
oretically. We validate our theoretical findings using
comprehensive numerical simulations, which reveal
that our distributed scheme can significantly outper-
form existing centralized and fully distributedmethods.
For the presented network setups, our proposed decen-
tralized scheme offers almost the same performance as
the centralized D2D FRAN scheme.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Consider a D2D-enabled wireless network, shown in Fig. 1,
that consists of N user devices (UDs), denoted by the set
N = {u1, u2, · · · , uN }. These UDs are interested in receiving
a delay-sensitive content representing a frame of M packets,
denoted by the set P = {p1, p2, · · · , pM }. The size of the
frame P depends on the sizes of the packet and content. This
work assumes that UDs have already acquired some packets
in P from previous transmissions, i.e., Huk denotes the Has
set of packets acquired by the uk -th UD. We assume UDs
request a set of packets, which is not included in their Has
sets, from the frame P . This requested set will be referred
as Wants set, i.e., Wuk = P \ Huk is set of wanted packets
for uk -th UD. The Has and Wants sets of all UDs can be
summarized in a binary N × M state matrix S = [suk ,pl ]
wherein the entry suk ,pl = 0 represents that the pl-th packet
2In the context of game theory in this paper, eachUD acts as a game player,
and thus, UDs and players are used interchangeably.
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FIGURE 1. Illustration of a partially connected D2D network with 13 UDs.
For simplicity, only the coverage zones of the possibly transmitting UDs
u2, u6, u8, and u11 are drawn.
is successfully received at the uk -th UD and 1 otherwise.
In order for all UDs to obtain the whole frame P from
D2D communications, we assume that at the beginning of
D2D transmissions each packet p1, 1 ≤ l ≤ M is received
by at least one UD, i.e.,
∑
uk∈U suk ,pl ≥ 1 for all packets
pl ∈ P . At each transmission slot, each UD can be packet
requester (receiver) or packet holder (transmitter) that can
provide its received packets to other requesting UDs via D2D
links. When any UD receives all its requested packets, it has
a large Has set size to generate a potential IDNC packet for
many neighboring UDs. Thus, it can be selected as a potential
D2D transmitter to serve a significant number of receiving
UDs.
This work considers a realistic partial network topology,
where UDs can only target the subset of UDs in their coverage
zone, denoted by Zuk of the uk -th UD. The network topology
can be captured by a unit diagonal symmetric N × N adja-
cency matrix Z that represents the connectivity of the UDs
such that Zukul = 1 if and only if ul ∈ Zuk . The matrix Z
is updated after each transmission based on the connectivity
index C , where C is a fractional connection ratio. We assume
that no part of the network is disjoint, i.e., the matrix Z is
connected. Otherwise, the proposed algorithm is separately
applied to each independent part of the network. Upon suc-
cessful reception of a packet, each UD sends an error-free
acknowledgment (ACK) to all UDs in its coverage zone to
update their Has and Wants sets. Therefore, maintaining a
feedbackmatrix of neighboringUDs required low complexity
and low signaling overhead than the fully connected model.
We focus only on the upper layer view of the network,
where network coding is performed at the network layer, and
a memory-less erasure channel abstracts the physical-layer.
This abstraction is widely used in network coding literature,
where a packet is either perfectly received or completely lost
with certain probability [11], [13], [26], [28]–[30], [33], [34],
[46]. Therefore, the physical channel between the uk -th and
the ul-th UDs is modeled by a Bernoulli random variable
whose mean σukul indicates the packet erasure probability
from uk -th UD to ul-th UD. We assume that these proba-
bilities remain constant during the transmission of a single
packet pl ∈ P , and they are known to all UDs. Due to the
channel’s asymmetry between the uk -th and the ul-th UDs,
the equality of σukul and σuluk is not guaranteed. To clarify the
system model and its corresponding variables, Fig. 1 shows a
partially connected D2D network with 13 UDs. The coverage
zones of the possibly transmitting green color UDs are drawn
and their targeted UDs are shown in violet color in Fig. 1.
Similarly, UDs in the intersection of transmitting UDs are
shown in red color, and those are located out of transmission
of any transmitting UD are shown in yellow color.
We consider a slowly changing network topology, in which
UDs have fixed locations during the IDNC packet transmis-
sion and change from one transmission to another. Thus, after
one transmission, the UDs are moved, and all the network
variables, such as the connectivity matrix and erasure proba-
bility between UDS are updated. It is important to note that
in fully connected networks, each UD is connected to all
other UDs in the network, and hence, it precisely knows the
Has and Wants sets of all UDs. To avoid any collision in
the network, only one UD is allowed to transmit an encoded
packet at any transmission slot. In partial connected D2D
networks, single-interface UDs can receive two transmissions
from different transmitting UDs, but this causes collisions.
This collision is due to two or more UDs transmit simultane-
ously using the same radio resource block, e.g., frequency.
As such, the receiving UD cannot decode these collided
packets correctly, see for examples [28]–[30], [33], [34], and
their references. Therefore, UDs are grouped in disjoint and
independent coalitions to avoid any collisions or conflict
transmissions. In particular, UDs are randomly grouped in
disjoint and independent coalitions. Then, using successive
split andmerge rules that explained in Section IV, UDs decide
to joint/leave their coalitions based on their own preferences
as well as coalitions’ preferences. The whole process of
grouping the UDs in disjoint coalitions is explained in details
in the proposed coalition formation solution in Section IV.
Considering the interference of transmissions caused by other
UDs to the set of transmitting UDs can be pursued in future
work.
B. INSTANTLY DECODABLE NETWORK CODING IN THE
NETWORK LAYER
IDNC XOR combination enables the complete packet recep-
tion at every time slot when each scheduled UD has at most
one packet in that XOR combination. Let puk be an XOR
combination sent by the uk -th UD to the set of scheduled
UDs u(puk ). Note that the packet combination puk ⊂ Huk
is an element of the power set X of the received packets at
the uk -th UD. A transmission from the uk -th UD is instantly
decodable at the ul-th UD if: i) it contains only one packet
from the Wants set of the ul-th UD and ii) the ul-th UD
is in the coverage zone of the uk -th UD. Therefore, the set
of targeted3 UDs by uk -th UD is expressed as u(puk ) ={
ul ∈ N
∣∣|puk ∩Wul | = 1 and ul ∈ Zuk }. In that case, the
ul-th UD can re-XOR the combination puk with Hul to
3The term ‘‘targetedUDs’’ is given for a set of scheduledUDs that receives
an instantly-decodable transmission.
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retrieve one of its requesting packets. Hence, we say that the
uk -th UD is a transmitting UD that can provide a set of its
received packets to a set of targeted UDs.
Let Ntra,t ⊂ N denote the set of transmitting UDs at
the t-th transmission and p(Ntra,t ) = (pu1 , · · · , pu|Ntra,t | )
denote the packet combinations to be sent by UDs in
Ntra,t . For simplicity, the transmission index t is often omit-
ted when it is clear from the context. Let u(p(Ntra)) =
(u(puk ), · · · , u(pu|Ntra| )) denote the set of targeted UDs by
the transmitting UDs wherein ul ∈ u(puk (Ntra)) implies that
|Wul∩puk (Ntra)| = 1 and {ul}∩Zuk ∩Zum = δukum{ul} for all
transmitting UDs um ∈ Ntra wherein δukum is the Kronecker
symbol. Mathematically, δukum{ul} = ul if uk = um and 0
otherwise.
Definition 1: The completion time of the uk -th UD,
denoted by Tuk , is the number of D2D transmissions required
to get all its requested packets inWuk . The overall completion
time T = maxuk∈N {Tuk } represents the time required for all
UDs to get all the packets.
We use IDNC to minimize the completion time required to
complete the delivery of all packets to all UDs in the partially
connected D2D network. Given that the direct minimization
of the completion time is intractable [30], we follow [15]
in reducing the completion time by controlling the decoding
delay.
Definition 2: The decoding delay of the ul-th UD, denoted
by Dul , increases by one unit if and only if Wul 6= ∅ and
the ul-th UD receives a non-instantly decodable transmission
from any transmitting UD in Ntra. The decoding delay D is
the sum of all individual delays.
C. COMPLETION TIME MINIMIZATION PROBLEM
FORMULATION
In this subsection, we formulate the distributed completion
time reduction problem in IDNC-enabled D2D network. Let
Nw be a binary vector of size N whose uk -th index is 1 if
the uk -th UD has non-empty Wants set, i.e., Wuk 6= ∅ and
0 otherwise, and let u(p(Ntra)) = 1 − u(p(Ntra)) be the set
of the non-targeted UDs by the encoded packets p(Ntra). The
different erasure occurrences at the t-th transmission slot are
denoted by ω : Z+ → {0, 1}N×N with ωt = [Yukul ], for all
(uk , ul) ∈ N 2, where Yukul is a Bernoulli random variable
equal to 0 with probability σukul .
Let nt = (n[u1], n[u2], · · · , n[uN ]) be a binary vector of
length N whose n[uk ]-th element is equal to 1 if uk -th UD
is transmitting, i.e., ‖n‖1 = |Ntra|. Likewise, let D(nt ) be
the decoding delay experienced by all UDs in the t-th trans-
mission slot. In particular,D(nt ) is a metric that quantifies the
ability of the transmitting UDs to generate innovative packets
for all the targeted UDs. This metric increases by one unit for
each UD that still requests packets and successfully receives
a non-useful transmission from any transmitting UD in Ntra
or for a transmitting UD that still requests some packets. Let
I = (I[u1], I[u2], · · · , I[uN ]) be a binary vector of size N
whose I[ul ] entry is 1 if the ul-th UD is hearing more than
one transmission from the set Ntra, i.e., ul ∈ Zuk ∩ Zum
where uk 6= um ∈ Ntra and 0 otherwise, and let O =
(O[u1],O[u2], · · · ,O[uN ]) be a binary vector of size N whose
O[ul ] element is 1 if the ul-th UD is out of transmission range
of any transmitting UD inNtra, i.e., ul /∈ Zuk ,∀uk ∈ Ntra and
0 otherwise. The used notations and variables in this paper
are summarized in Table 1.
Given the aforementioned configurations, the overall
decoding delays D(nt ) experienced by all UDs, since the
beginning of the delivery phase until the t-th transmission,
can be expressed as follows.
D(nt ) = D(nt−1)+
{
N if ‖nt‖1 = 0
I +O + nt +D(nt ) otherwise.
(1)
As mentioned, the completion time is a difficult and
intractable metric to optimize. However, the authors in [15]
proposed to approximate such metric by the anticipated com-
pletion time which can be computed at each transmission
using the decoding delay. The anticipated completion time
that uses the decoding delay in (1) is defined as follows.
Definition 3: The anticipated completion time of the uk -th
UD is defined by the following expression
Tuk (nt ) =
|Wuk ,0| + Duk (nt )− E[σuk ]
1− E[σuk ]
, (2)
where |Wuk ,0| is the number of the requested packets in the
Wants set of uk -th UD at the beginning of delivery phase and
E[σuk ] is the expected erasure probability linking uk -th UD
to the other UDs in its coverage.
Clearly, (2) represents the number of D2D transmissions
that are required for the uk -th UD to receive all the packets
inWuk . It depends on the initial set of requested packets by
each UD, decoding delay, and packets’ erasures. Essentially,
the decoding delay is a metric that quantifies the ability of the
D2D transmitters to generate innovative packets for receiving
UDs. As previously stated, this metric increases by one unit
for each UD that still requested packets and successfully
receives a non-useful transmission.
The overall anticipated completion time can be written
as T (nt ) = maxuk (Tuk (nt )) = ‖T (nt )‖∞. Therefore, the
anticipated completion time minimization problem at the t-
th transmission slot in IDNC-enabled partially D2D network
can be written as follows.
min
nt∈{0,1}N
p(Ntra)∈{0,1}M
‖T (nt )‖∞. (3)
Unlike a fully connected model that only requires opti-
mization over a single transmitting UD and its correspond-
ing packet combination, a partially connected model needs
to select the set of transmitting UDs Ntra and the encoded
packets p(Ntra). As such, the probability of increasing the
anticipated completion time is minimized.
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TABLE 1. Variables and parameters of the system.
D. EXAMPLE OF IDNC TRANSMISSIONS IN A PARTIALLY
CONNECTED D2D NETWORK
This section illustrates the aforementioned definitions and
concepts through a simple example. Consider a simple par-
tially connected D2D network containing 6 UDs and a frame
P = {p1, p2, p3, p4} as illustrated in Fig. 2. The acquired and
wanted packets of all UDs are given on the left part of Fig. 2,
and the coverage zone of each UD is represented by edges.
For ease of analysis, we assume error-free transmissions.
Assume that the u1-th and the u6-th UDs transmit pu1 =
p3 ⊕ p4 and pu6 = p1 ⊕ p4 in the first transmission slot
to the sets u(pu1 ) = {u2, u3, u5} and u(pu6 ) = {u4, u5},
respectively. In the second transmission slot, assume that the
u4-th and the u1-th UDs transmit pu4 = p2 and pu1 = p2⊕p4
to the sets u(pu4 ) = {u6} and u(pu1 ) = {u2, u5}, respectively.
The decoding delay experienced by the different UDs is given
as follows.
• The u5-th UD experiences one unit delay as it is in the
intersection of the coverage zone of transmitting UDs
u1 and u6. In other words, u5 is in collision, i.e., u5 ∈ I.
Thus, the u5-th UD cannot decode packet p6 transmitted
by the u6-th UD.
• The u6-th UD experiences one unit of delay as it trans-
mits in the first transmission slot.
Under this scenario, we have the following assumption.
• First transmission slot: Nw = (0 1 1 1 1 1), the
set of transmitting UDs Ntra,1 = {u1, u6} = n1 =
(1 0 0 0 0 1), the corresponding encoded packets
p(Ntra,1) = (pu1 ,pu6 ), and the set of targeted UDs
u(p(Ntra,1)) = {(u2, u3), (u4)}. The set of UDs hearing
more than one transmission I = (0 0 0 0 1 0), and the set
of UDs that out of transmission range of anyUD inNtra,1
isO = 0. The decoding delay experienced by all UDs is
D(n1) = (0 0 0 0 1 1). The accumulative decoding delay
is D(n1) = (0 0 0 0 1 1).
FIGURE 2. A partially connected D2D network containing 6 UDs and 4
packets.
• Second transmission slot: Nw = (0 1 0 0 1 1),
the set of transmitting UDs Ntra,2 = {u1, u4} =
n2 = (1 0 0 1 0 0), the corresponding encoded packets
p(Ntra,2) = (pu1 ,pu4 ), and the set of targeted UDs
u(p(Ntra,2)) = {(u2, u5), (u6)}. The set of UDs hearing
more than one transmission I = 0, and the set of UDs
that out of transmission range of any UD in Ntra,2 is
O = 0. The decoding delay is D(n2) = 0 and the
accumulative decoding delay D(n2) = (0 0 0 0 1 1).
• The completion time of all UDs after the second trans-
mission is T = (0 2 1 1 2 2). Thus, the maximum
completion time is 2 transmission slots which represents
the overall completion time for all UDs to get their
requested packets, i.e., Nw = 0.
III. DISTRIBUTED COMPLETION TIME MINIMIZATION AS
A COALITION GAME
Our main goal is to develop a distributed framework that
models the collaborations among the UDs of IDNC-enabled
partially connected D2D network. In order to do that, we use
game theory because it involves a set of players that interact
with each other to form a coalition without any coordination
from the CP. The key idea of forming coalitions is to study the
cooperative behavior of UDs in coalitions. In particular, UDs
are formed coalitions to minimize their completion times
compared to when they do not form coalitions as will be
discussed in Section IV. With coalitions and IDNC content
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delivery among players, the overall completion time can be
reduced.
In this section, we first model the completion time problem
in IDNC-enabled partially connected D2D networks using a
coalition game [35]. Afterward, we define and provide funda-
mental concepts in coalition games. These concepts are used
in Section IV to derive the proposed distributed completion
time reduction solution.
A. COMPLETION TIME MINIMIZATION AS A COALITION
GAME
We use a coalition game that suites our model to formulate
the completion mentioned above time problem. In partic-
ular, our problem is modeled as a coalition game with a
non-transferable utility (NTU) [35].
Definition 4: A coalition game with a non-transferable
utility is defined as a pair (N , φ), where N is the set of
players consisting of N UDs and φ is a real function such that
for every coalition Ss ⊆ N , φ(Ss) is the payoff that coalition
Ss receives which cannot be arbitrarily apportioned between
its players.
For the considered D2D completion time problem with
coalition games, packets are transmitted simultaneously from
a set of cooperative transmitting UDsNtra. Each transmitting
UD serves a group of interested and nearby UDs that con-
stitutes a coalition. In the coalition game, each UD acts as a
game player and aims to join a coalition such that: i) it can
receive packets and minimize its completion time, and ii) it
does not increase the completion time of its alliances in the
coalition. Therefore, for each coalition, we need to determine
the transmitting player and its packet combination that is
beneficial to a set of interested players. As such, we minimize
the increasing of the completion time.
Let φ(Ss) = (φu1 (Ss), · · · , φu|Ss| (Ss)) define a tuple
wherein element φuk (Ss) represents the payoff of uk -th UD
in coalition Ss, where Ss ⊆ N , and |Ss| is the total number
of players in Ss. We use s as the subscript to identify coali-
tions. The |S|-dimensional vector represents the family of
real vector payoffs of coalition Ss, which is denoted by φ(Ss).
Consequently, by adopting the cooperative D2D completion
model described in the previous section, the total payoff of
any coalition Ss ⊆ N , ∀s = {1, · · · ,m} is given by
φ(Ss) = max
uk
(φuk (Ss)) = ‖φ(Ss)‖∞, (4)
where φuk (Ss) is the payoff of uk -th UD in a coalition Ss
which is in our problem given by
φuk (Ss) = −‖Tuk (nt )‖∞ − ‖Duk (nt )− Duk (nt−1)‖1. (5)
The payoff function in (4) represents the total payoff that
a coalition receives due to self-organize players. For a player
uk ∈ Ss, the first term in (5) represents the maximum antic-
ipated completion time among players in Ss that is defined
in (2). Similarly, the second term in (5) represents the aug-
mentation of the sum decoding delay that is defined in (1).
Therefore, players in coalitions prefer to increase the payoff
in (5) by minimizing the anticipated completion time through
controlling the decoding delay. Note that the negative sign
indicates that the payoff of a coalition is inversely propor-
tional to the completion time.
Property 1: The proposed D2D completion time coopera-
tive problem is modeled as a coalition game with NTU (N , φ)
whereN is the set of players andφ is the payoff function given
by (4).
Proof: From the nature of definition 1 and definition 2,
the uk -th player has its own unique anticipated completion
time and decoding delay, and, thus, it has a unique payoff
φuk (Ss) within a coalition Ss. Therefore, the payoff function
in (4) cannot be arbitrarily apportioned between coalition’s
players. Thus (4) is considered as anNTU. Further, the overall
completion time is the maximum individual completion times
of the players regardless of the coalition. In other words, the
dependency of φ(Ss) in any coalition structure is not only
on packet delivery of players inside Ss, but also on packet
delivery outside Ss, which concludes that the proposed game
model is NTU game.
Although cooperation generally reduces the payoffs of
players [35], it is limited by inherent information exchange
cost that needs to be paid by the players when acting coop-
eratively. Consequently, for any coalition Ss ⊆ N , play-
ers need to exchange information for cooperation, which is
an increasing function of the coalition size. The problem
becomes severe when all players are in the same coalition,
i.e., grand coalition (GC). However, given the realistic sce-
nario of a partially connected network where each UD has
limited coverage zone, it is highly likely that when attempting
to form the GC, one of these scenarios will hold:
• There exists a pair of the uk -th, the ul-th players in N
that are distant enough to receive packets within the GC.
Thus, they have no incentive to join the grand coalition.
• There exists a player uk ∈ N with a payoff in GC
φuk (N ) that is less than its payoff in any coalition
φuk (Ss). Hence, this player has an incentive to deviate
from the GC.
Further, the limited coverage players in the considered par-
tially connected D2D model would most likely form small
coalitions’ sizes, not large coalitions’ sizes. Therefore, the
GC of all players is seldom formed, and the cooperation
cost due to forming small coalitions’ sizes would not have
a significant impact on the payoff functions.
The aforementioned discussion emphasizes that the pro-
posed (N , φ) game is classified as a coalition formation game
(CFG) [36], where limited coverage-zone players form sev-
eral independent disjoint coalitions. Hence, classical solution
concepts for coalition games, such as the core [35], may not
apply to our problem. In summery, the proposed coalition
game (N , φ) is a CFG, where the objective is to develop an
algorithm for forming coalitions.
B. COALITION FORMATION CONCEPTS
This section provides some concepts of coalition forma-
tion games that will be used in the next subsection. CFG,
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a subclass of coalition games, has been a topic of high interest
in game theory research [36], [37], [39]. The fundamental
approach in coalition formation games is to allow players
in the formation set to join or leave a coalition based on a
well-defined and most suitable preference for NTU games,
i.e., Pareto Order. Pareto Order is the basis of many exist-
ing coalition formation concepts, e.g., the merge-and-split
algorithm [38].
Definition 5: A coalition structure, denoted as 9,
is defined as 9 = {S1, · · · ,Sm} for 1 < |Sm| < |N |
independent disjoint coalitions Sm of 9.
One can see from definition 5 that different coalition struc-
tures may lead to different system payoffs as each coalition
structure 9 has its unique payoff φ(9). These differences in
9 and their corresponding payoffs φ(9) are usually ordered
through a comparison relationship. In the coalition game
literature, see for example, [38], comparison relationships
based on orders are divided into individual value orders and
coalition value orders. Individual value order implies that
comparison is performed based on the players’ payoffs. This
is referred to as the Pareto Order. In particular, in such order,
no player is willing to move to another coalition when it has a
negative effect on the payoff of that coalition. In other words,
the payoff of players can be worse off after the new player
joins. This is known as selfish behavior. Coalition order
implies that two coalition structures are compared based on
the payoff of the coalitions in these coalition structures. This
is known as a utilitarian order and is denoted by F. In other
words, the notation 92 F 91 means that φ(92) > φ(91).
Subsequently, the definition of the preference operator that
considered in this paper is given as follows.
Definition 6: A preference operator F is defined for com-
paring two coalition structures 91 = {S1, · · · ,Sm} and
92 = {R1, · · · ,Rn} that are partitions of the same set of
players N . The notation 92 F 91 denotes that players in N
are preferred to be in 92 than 91.
IV. PROPOSED FULLY DISTRIBUTED SOLUTION
A. COALITION FORMATION CONSTRAINTS
LetNs be the set of all associated players in theSs-th coalition
and Ns,w the subset of Ns that have non-empty Wants set.
LetMs be the subset of packets that in the Has set of each
player in Ns, which defined as Ms = ⋃uk∈Ns Huk . Let
Ss denote the set of all neighboring coalitions to the Ss-th
coalition. For the Ss-th coalition, the un∗s -th transmitting UD
is the one that can achieve the least expected increase in the
completion time. According to the analysis available in [33],
[34], a transmitting UD un∗s and its packet combination pun∗s
sent to the set of UDs u(pun∗s ) can be obtained by solving the
following problem
un∗s = argmax
un∈Ntra,s\Ls
|Zun ∩Ns,w|
+ max
pun∈p(Ntra,s)
∑
ul∈Ls∩u(pun )
log
1
σunul
, (6)
whereNtra,s is the set of players in coalition Ss that are not in
any coverage zone of all other players inSs andLs is the set of
critical players that can potentially increase the overall payoff
of the coalition Ss. This set characterizes the players based
on their anticipated completion times to give them priority
to be targeted in the next transmission. In other words, Ls,t
contains players that will potentially increase the maximum
anticipated completion time if they are not targeted in the t-th
transmission. It can be expressed as
Ls,t =
{
uk ∈ N ∩Ns,w
∣∣Tuk (nt−1)+ 11− E[σuk ]
> ‖T (nt−1)‖∞
}
. (7)
The set of targeted players in coalition Ss when device un∗s
transmits the combination pun∗s is
u(pun∗s ) =
{
uk ∈ Ss
∣∣|pun∗s ∩Wuk | = 1 and Zun∗s uk = 1} .
With the aforementioned variable definitions, we can
reformulate the completion time minimization problem in
IDNC-based partially connected D2D network per coalition
at each transmission slot as follows
min
nt∈{0,1}|Ns|
p∈{0,1}|Ms|
φ(Ss) (8a)
s. t. |u(pun∗s )| > 1, (8b)
u(pun∗s ) ∩ u(pn∗v ) = ∅,∀un∗s 6= un∗v ∈ Ss. (8c)
Constraint (8b) says that the number of targeted players in
each coalition must be more than one to ensure that at each
transmission at least one player is benefiting. Constraint (8c)
states that all the targeted players should not experience any
collision. To find the optimal solution to the problem in (8),
we need to search over all the sets of optimal player-coalition
associations, their different erasure probabilities, players’
actions, and their optimal IDNC packets. As pointed out
in [29] for a centralized fog system, this is an intractable
problem. Further, the solution to (8) must go through the
players’ decisions to join/leave a coalition at each stage of
the game. To seek an efficient solution to (8) that is capable of
achieving significant completion time reduction, a distributed
coalition formation algorithm is developed.
B. A DISTRIBUTED COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
We develop a distributed coalition formation algorithm to
obtain the minimum completion time of UDs. The key mech-
anism is to allow players in the coalition formation process to
make individual decisions for selecting potential coalitions at
any transmission slot. We first define two rules of merge-and-
split that allow the modification of 9 of the setN players as
follows.
Definition 7 (Merge Operation): Any set of coalitions
{S1, · · · ,Sm} in 91 can be merged if and only if
(
m⋃
s=1
Ss, 92) F ({S1, · · · ,Sm}, 91). Thus,
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{S1, · · · ,Sm} → {
m⋃
s=1
Ss} and 91 → 92, where
m⋃
s=1
Ss
and 92 are the new set of coalitions and the new coalition
structure after the merge operation, respectively.
Definition 8 (Split Operation): Any set of coalitions
m⋃
s=1
Ss
in 91 can be split if and only if ({S1, · · · ,Sm}, 92) F
(
m⋃
s=1
Ss, 91). Thus, {
m⋃
s=1
Ss} → {S1, · · · ,Sm} and91→ 92,
where {S1, · · · ,Sm} and 92 are the new set of coalitions
and the new coalition structure after the split operation,
respectively.
The merge rule implies that two coalitions merge if their
merger can benefit not only the players in the united alliance
but also benefit the overall coalition structure value, i.e., the
whole completion time. On the other hand, a coalition split
into smaller ones if its splitter coalitions enhance at least the
payoff of one player in that coalition. Therefore, using these
two well-known rules, we present a distributed algorithm to
solve the completion time minimization problem in (3) as
follows.
Step 1 (Coalition Members Discovery): Players in the
initialized random coalition structure 9ini discover their
neighbors by utilizing one of different well-known neighbor
discovery schemes, e.g., those used in wireless networks [48].
For example, the uk -th player broadcasts a message consist-
ing of two segments; each segment consists of one byte.
While the first byte indicates the number of players in its
coverage zoneZuk , the second byte indicates the uk ’s comple-
tion time. Further, players use the collected aforementioned
information to decide on the one who: i) has a large Has set
that can serve a large number of players in its coverage zone,
and ii) not in the coverage zone of any player in any other
coalitions in 9ini. However, if such a player does not exist,
the size of the coalition is increased until that player exists.
To summarize, the un∗s -th selected transmitting player in Ss-
th coalition should satisfy (8b) and (8c) and can be obtained
by solving problem (6). Afterward, each player evaluates its
potential payoff as in (5) to make an accurate decision in
step 2. The un∗s selected player in Ss-th coalition (∀Ss ∈ 9ini)
will do the analysis in step 2. This step significantly reduces
the search space for associating the players to the coalitions.
Step 2 (Coalition Formation for Players’ Association):
This step optimizes the selection of the transmitting play-
ers and their packet combinations in step 1 through many
successive split-and-merge rules between coalitions. There-
fore, step 2 is to associate players to potential neighboring
coalitions, select the transmitting player, and find its packet
combination, which can be accomplished by the following.
In this step, the index is updated to τ = τ + 1. The merge
rules are implemented by checking the merging possibilities
of each pair of neighboring coalitions Ss and Sv. Initially,
9τ = 9ini. Thus, a coalition Ss ∈ 9τ can decide to merge
with another coalition Sv ∈ Ss to form a new coalition Sj.
As such, the resulting structure guarantees the two merge
conditions (MC) defined as follows.
• MC1: There exists at least one player satisfies
(8b) and (8c).
• MC2: At least one player in the merged coalition can
enhance its individual payoff without affecting the pay-
offs of all the remaining players.
After all the coalitions havemade their merge decisions based
on the players’ preferences, the merge rules end. This results
in the updated coalition structure9τ . Similarly, the split rules
are performed on the players that do not benefit from being
a member of a certain coalition. In other terms, coalition
Ss ∈ 9τ can be split into coalitions of smaller sizes as
long as the splitter coalitions guarantee the following split
conditions (SC).
• SC1: At least one player can strictly enhance its pay-
off without affecting the payoffs of all the remaining
players.
• SC2: In each split coalition, there exists at least one
player satisfying (8b) and (8c).
At the end of the split rules, the coalition structure 91 is
updated. The index τ is updated along with a sequence of
merge-and-split rules which take place in a distributed man-
ner. Such sequence continues based on the resulting payoff
of each player and coalition. It ends when there are no further
merge-and-split rules required in the current coalition struc-
ture9τ , which is the final converged coalition structure9fin.
Step 3 (IDNC Packet Transmissions:) Each transmitting
UD in each coalition broadcasts its IDNC packet to all UDs
in its coverage zone. Accordingly, each targeted UD by any
transmitter sends ACK to all its neighboring UDs indicating
its packet reception status. Thus, the Has and Wants sets of
all UDs in the system are updated.
The coalition formation algorithm is distributively exe-
cuted at each transmission slot and summarized in Algo-
rithm 1. It is repeated until all packets are delivered to all UDs,
as presented in Algorithm 2.
Some remarks on executing Algorithm 1 are given below.
• The merge-and-split rules enumerate only neighboring
coalitions, and this does not necessarily need significant
computations. To further reduce the computations, the
players of a coalition Ss can avoid merging with other
neighboring coalition Sv if the payoffs of the players in
both coalitions are equal φuk (Ss) = φul (Sv), ∀uk ∈ Ss
and ∀ul ∈ Sv.
• Forming coalitions only one time, i.e., at the beginning
of the transmission round, is not guaranteed to deliver
all packets to all players. This is because players in
each formed coalition have only some packets and do
not have the requested packets of other players in other
coalitions. For delivering all the requested packets to
all players (i.e. UDs), each coalition is formed, at each
transmission slot, based on the individual preference
of its alliances and irrespective of the Has sets of its
alliances. Thus, each transmitting player has delivered
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Algorithm 1 Coalition Formation Algorithm
Input: N , P ,Huk ,Wuk , Zuk , ∀uk ∈ N .;
Initialization: 9ini = {S1, · · · ,Sm}, τ = 0,
9τ = 9ini.;
Step 1: Coalition Members Discovery;
• Each player discovers its neighboring players.;
for each Ss ∈ 9ini,∀s = {1, 2, · · · , m} do
Select the transmitting players Ntra,s that satisfying
(8b) and (8c).;
Solve (6) to find un∗s and its packet combination
pun∗s .;
Calculate φuk (Ss) as in (5), ∀uk ∈ Ns.;
end for
Step 2: Coalition Formation;
• The optimization target in coalition Ss is
min
nt∈{0,1}|Ns|
p∈{0,1}|Ms|
φ(Ss).;
• Obtain player’s assignments based on the two main
rules of merge and split:;
repeat
Update τ = τ + 1.;
for each Ss ∈ 9τ−1,∀s = {1, 2, · · · ,m} do
un∗s analyzes all possible merge rules with Ss.;
If a merge occurs:
1) Update 9τ−1.;
2) Solve (6) to update Ntra,s and un∗s .;
Set 9τ = 9τ−1.
end for
for each Ss ∈ 9τ ,∀s = {1, 2, · · · ,m} do
un∗s analyzes all possible split rules.;
If a split occurs:
1) Update 9τ .;
2) Update Ntra,s and un∗s by solving (6).;
end for
until No further merge nor split rules;
Output The convergence coalition structure 9fin = 9τ .;
Step 3: IDNC Packet Transmission;
• Each un∗s in each coalition Ss broadcasts pun∗s to all
players in its coverage zone, ∀s = {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
some packets to each visited coalition in previous trans-
missions.
• The connectivity constraints of UDs are incorporated in
the coalition formations by: i) forming disjoint coalitions
of nearby UDs based on their preferences, and ii) select-
ing the potential transmitting UD that can only target its
connected players in its coalition. As such, wemake sure
that connected UDs are grouped into a single coalition.
In the considered game, each player has two actions
to take such as, it can either transmit a packet combina-
tion p or it can listen to a transmission. Therefore, the
action of the uk -th player at the t-th transmission slot is
Algorithm 2 Overall Completion Time Approach for
Solving Problem (3)
Data: N , P ,Huk ,Wuk , Zuk , Tuk = 0, Duk = 0,
∀uk ∈ N and .;
Initialize: Transmission slot t = 1
Repeat:
• Execute Algorithm 1 to obtain Ntra,t , p(Ntra,t ), and
u(p(Ntra,t )) in 9fin.;
• For ∀un∗s ∈ Ntra,t do;
– Each uk ∈ u(pun∗s ) re-XOR pun∗s withHuk .
– Calculate the completion time of each
uk ∈ u(pun∗s ) as in (2).
– Each uk ∈ u(pun∗s ) broadcasts one bit ACK to all
players in Zuk .
• End for
• t = t + 1.
• UpdateHuk ,Wuk , ∀uk ∈ Nw.
UntilWuk = φ, ∀uk ∈ Nw.;
Output: Transmission slot t .
ACuk ,t = {transmit puk , remain silent}. The asymmetry
of the side information at each player generates a different
packet combination to be sent by each player at each trans-
mission slot. This causes the asymmetry of the action space
of each player. Also, in each transmission, different players
are associated with each coalition. All these make the payoff
of each coalition unique.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS, COMPLEXITY, AND
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
A. CONVERGENCE AND STABILITY
The stability of the coalition structures in coalition formation
games corresponds to an equilibrium state known as Nash-
equilibrium. Here, we prove that the resulting coalition struc-
ture from Algorithm 1 is converged, and it is a Nash-stable.
The following theorem demonstrates that Algorithm 1 ter-
minates in a finite number of iterations.
Theorem 1: Given any initial coalition structure 9ini, the
coalition formation step of Algorithm 1 maps to a sequence
of merge-and-split rules which converges, in a finite number
of iterations, to a final coalition structure9fin composed of a
number of disjoint coalitions.
Proof: To proof this theorem, we need to show that for
any merge or split rule, there exists a new coalition structure
that results from the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1.
Starting from any initial coalition structure9ini, the coalition
formation step of Algorithm 1 can be mapped to a sequence
of merge/split rules. As per definition 8 and definition 9,
every merge or split rule transforms the current coalition
structure into another coalition structure. Hence, we obtain
the following sequence of coalition structures
9ini→ 91→ 92→ · · · 9fin (9)
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where9i+1 F9i, and→ indicates the occurrence of a merge-
and-split rule. Since the Pareto Order introduced in definition
6 is irreflexive, transitive, andmonotonic, a coalition structure
cannot be revisited. Given the fact that the number of merge
and split rules of a finite set is finite, the number of coalition
structure sequences in (9) is finite. Therefore, the sequence
in (9) always terminates and converge to a final coalition
structure 9fin.
Definition 9: A coalition structure 9 = {S1, · · · Sm} is a
Nash-stable if players have no incentive to leave 9 through
merge-and-split operations.
This definition implies that any coalition structure 9 is
considered as a Nash-stable coalition structure if and only if
no player has an incentive to move from its current coalition
and join another coalition or make an individual decision by
performing any merge/split rules. Further, the players in the
final coalition structure 9fin have no incentive to do more
merge and split operations. A Nash-stable coalition structure
is also an individually stable coalition structure. In general,
in a coalition formation game, Nash-stability is a subset of
individual stability [47]. Specifically, no player leaves its
current coalition through a split rule and form an empty
coalition, i.e., no singleton coalition is created if the following
property holds.
Property 2: There exists at least one coalition structure9
that satisfies both Nash-stability and individual stability if
and only if ∀Ss ∈ 9 such that |Ss| > 1.
Proof: This property states that forming a singleton
coalition cannot happen. Indeed, since each player cannot
send an encoded packet to itself, it believes that a better
payoff can be obtained by being a member of any coali-
tion. Further, since the payoff of a non-targeted player in
any coalition and a single player-coalition is the same, our
proposed algorithm, as mentioned in the previous section,
avoids making any merge-and-split rules for equal payoff
values. Thus, according to Algorithm 1, a Nash-stable and
individual stable coalition structure can be obtained.
As a consequence of Property 2, the final coalition struc-
ture 9fin that results from Algorithm 1 is Dhp stable as
the coalitions have no incentive to do further merge-and-
split operations. Dhp stable is also known as merge-and-split
proof [47]. Furthermore,9fin can be considered as Dc stable.
This is because players have no incentive to leave 9fin and
form any other coalitions [38]. In what follows, we provide
an example to discuss the aforementioned stability concepts
of the resulting coalition structure from Algorithm 1.
B. COALITION FORMATION EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the proposed coalition formation algo-
rithm and its stability concepts, consider the example pre-
sented in Fig. 2. For ease of analysis, we assume error-free
transmissions. Given the coverage zone of the players and
their side information as in Fig. 2, the resulting coalition
structure9fin fromAlgorithm 1 consists of two disjoint coali-
tions {S1,S2} where only one player transmits in each coali-
tion. In particular, in coalition S1, player u4 transmits packet
FIGURE 3. A resulting coalition structure 9fin = {S1,S2} from
Algorithm 1 for a partially connected D2D network that is presented in
Fig. 2.
p1 to player u6, and in coalition S2, player u1 transmits the
combination p3⊕p4 to players u2, u3, and u5. The transmitting
player in each coalition is shown in red circle, and their
targeted players and the packet combinations are shown in
Fig. 3. Given the resulting coalition structure9fin = {S1,S2}
that shown in Fig. 3, we now analyze its Nash stability. The
coalition structure 9fin is a Nash-stable as no player has an
incentive to leave its current coalition. For example, player u5
has a payoff of φu5 (S2) = −2 when being part of the coalition
S2 = {u1, u2, u3, u5}. The payoff φu5 (S2) is calculated as
follows. Since player u5 receives an instantly-decodable com-
bination from player u1, it does not experience any decoding
delay increases. Thus, by (2), its anticipated completion time
is Tu5 (nt ) = |Wu5,0|+Du5 (nt )−E[σu5 ]1−E[σu5 ] = 2, and, by (5) its payoff
is−2. If player u5 switches to act non-cooperatively and joins
S1, player u6 can be the new transmitting player in S1. In this
case, player u5 will be in the coverage zone of both transmit-
ting players u1 in S2 and u6 in S1. Consequently, the payoff of
player u5 decreases to φu5 (S1) = −3, and the payoff of player
u6 decreases from φu6 (S1) = −3 to φu6 (S1) = −4. Thus,
player u5 does not deviate form its current coalition S2 and
join S1. Similarly, if players u2 and u3 act non-cooperatively
by leaving S2 and forming a singleton coalition for each,
i.e., S3 and S4, their payoffs decrease from φu2 ({2}) = −2
and φu3 ({3}) = −1 to φu2 (S3) = −3 and φu3 (S4) = −2,
respectively. Clearly, 9fin is an individual Nash-stable as it
does not have any singleton coalition. Further, it is both Dhp
and Dc stable as no further merge-and-split operations can be
performed by the coalitions and no player has incentive to
deviate from 9fin, respectively.
C. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND COMMUNICATION
OVERHEAD
Here, we analyze the complexity and communication burden
of Algorithm 1.
1) COMPLEXITY
EachUD at any transmission slot generates a packet combina-
tion that depends on its previously received packets. Further,
since a game with incomplete information, i.e., each UD
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knows only the received and requested packets of UDs in its
coverage zone, every UD generates its packet combinations
of all other UDs in its coverage zone. This allows every UD
to calculate the payoff function (5) of all other UDs in its
coverage zone.
The complexity of generating the packet combination by
the CP using a maximum weight search method is given
as follows. First, the CP generates all the vertices that rep-
resent all UDs and their requested packets, which needs a
computational complexity of O(NM ). Note that a vertex is
generated for each file pl that is being requested by each UD
uk , ∀pl ∈ P,∀uk ∈ N . The CP, then, connects these ver-
tices (circles) by edges (connections) that represent network
coding conditions. This needs a computational complexity of
O(N 2M2). Afterward, the CP executes the maximum weight
search method that computes the weight of O(NM ) vertices
and selects a maximum of N UDs. Hence, the overall com-
plexity of finding the IDNC packet is O(NM )+O(N 2M2)+
O(N 2M ) = O(N 2M2) operations [11]. In our case, the com-
putational complexity for generating the packet combination
at each UD is bounded by O(N 2M2). This is because the
number of UDs in the coverage zone of each UD is less than
the total number of UDs in the network.
2) COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The communication overhead of Algorithm 1 is related to
perform the members’ discovery step, transmitting player
selection, and the analysis of merge-and-split rules. The com-
munication overhead analysis is explained as follows.
Step 1: Similar to many algorithms in the literature, e.g.,
[48], the member discovery step needs |N | 2-byte messages,
in which each message is being sent by every UD to all its
neighbors which is denoted by N. Thus, the total communi-
cation overhead for discovering the neighbor UDs is |2NN|
bytes.
Step 2: Selecting the transmitting player in each coalition
can be performed in many different strategies, e.g., based
on players’ attributes [49], [50]. In Algorithm 1, coalition’s
members initially exchange an advertisementmessage among
them, and the one that satisfies the conditions in Section IV-B
can be selected as a transmitting player in that coalition. The
same process is applied for selecting/updating the transmit-
ting player in step III. Since it is connected to most players
in the coalition, the transmitting player is responsible for
ensuring that the rest of the coalition’s members received an
acknowledgment (ACK). As such, they update their Has and
Wants sets after each D2D transmission.
Step 3: The communication overhead due to forming coali-
tions is based on the number of merge-and-split operations.
This is mainly related to the total number of decisions
made by each of the N players. As previously mentioned in
Section IV-B, the merge-and-split operations enumerate only
the neighboring coalitions Ss. Thus, two extreme cases can
occur:
• If all coalitions’ alliances decide to leave their current
coalitions and join other coalitions. In this case, the uk -th
player in the Ss-th coalition will make |Ss| decisions
(the uk -th player has |Ss| possibilities to join any of the
neighbor coalitions). Consequently, the total number of
players’ decisions is Qworst = N |Ss|.
• If players did not make any decisions. Since players
make no decision, the overhead, in this case, is only
Qbest = N (due to the initial player-coalition associa-
tions in step 1).
In practical, the number of players’ decisions is between the
above two cases, i.e.,Qbest ≤ Q ≤ Qworst. Hence, if L average
decisions are made by players, then Q = NL decisions that
perform split-and-merge rules in Algorithm 1.
Therefore, combining all the overhead signaling compo-
nents, the total overhead in each transmission is N (2N+ L).
Such signaling cost will add only a few bytes, which are
negligible in size compared to the entire packet’s size. Fur-
thermore, to update the Has and Wants sets of UDs, only the
indices of packets need to be exchanged between the UDs,
not their contents. Hence, we ignore the overhead signaling
factor because it is a constant (independent on the completion
time and decoding delay) and its size is negligible.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section evaluates the performance of our proposed coali-
tion formation game (denoted by CFG partially-connected
D2D) to demonstrate its capability of reducing the comple-
tion time compared to existing schemes. We first give the
simulation setup and implemented schemes. Then, the com-
pletion time and game performances are comprehensively
evaluated.
A. SIMULATION SETUP
We consider a partially connected D2D network where every
UD is connected to some other UDs within its coverage zone
based on the connectivity index C , which is defined as the
ratio of the average number of neighboring UDs to the total
number of UDsN . The consideredmodel is shown in Fig. 1 in
the system model section. Further, the UDs in the considered
model are uniformly re-positioned after each transmission in
a 500m×500m cell. The system setting in this paper follows
the setup studied in [28], [29]. As mentioned in the system
model, eachUD has already acquired some packets andwants
some other packets from the set P . Such initial Has and
Wants sets Huk andWuk , ∀uk ∈ N of UDs is independently
drawn based on their erasure probabilities. The short-range
D2D links are more reliable than the CP-UD communications
[26], [27]. Hence, we assume that the player-to-player erasure
probability σ is half the CP-to-UD erasure , i.e., σ = 0.5.
Unless otherwise stated, the simulation parameters are listed
in Table 2. Our simulations were implemented using Matlab
on a Windows 10 laptop 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and
8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM. For the sake of comparison,
we implement the following schemes.
• The fully-connected D2D scheme: In this scheme,
a single UD who has the largest number of received
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TABLE 2. Simulation parameters.
packets transmits an IDNC packet at each transmission
slot.
• The Point to Multi-Point (PMP) scheme: The CP in
this scheme is responsible for the transmissions. It pro-
vides all the requested packets to all the UDs. This
scheme was proposed in [15].
• The one coalition formation game: This scheme is
denoted by OCF partially-connected D2D. Only one
coalition is formed in this scheme, and accordingly,
a single UD transmits an IDNC packet at each trans-
mission. The transmitting UD is selected based on its
number of received packets as well as on the maximum
number of UDs in its coverage zone.
• The FRAN partially-connected D2D scheme:. In this
scheme, a fog central unit is responsible for determining
the set of transmitting UDs and their corresponding
packet combinations. The content delivery problem in
partially-connected D2D network was solved by opti-
mization as explained in [29].
B. COMPLETION TIME PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The total number of transmissions, that are required until all
UDs receive all their requested packets, measure the overall
completion time. Thus, all the simulated schemes are exe-
cuted until all UDs receive all their requested packets. The
presented average values of the number of transmissions are
computed over a certain number of iterations. To study the
number of required transmissions of the proposed solution,
we change the number of players, packets, connectivity index,
and packet’s erasure probability.
In Fig. 4, we depict the average number of transmissions
versus the number of players N for a network composed of
M = 30 packets,  = 0.25, σ = 0.12, and connectivity
index C = 0.4. It is observed from Fig. 4 that the pro-
posed CFG partially-connected D2D algorithm outperforms
the PMP, fully-connected D2D, and OCF partially-connected
D2D schemes for all simulated numbers of players. This is
because of the simultaneous IDNC packet transmissions from
cooperating players. In particular, the fully-connected D2D
system only considers the size of the Has set as a metric
to select a single UD for transmission at each transmission
slot, i.e., un∗ = max
un∈N
Hun . The OCF partially-connected D2D
scheme focuses on the maximum number of connected UDs
to be formed as well as on the size of the Has set of the
transmitting UD. On the other hand, although the transmitter
FIGURE 4. Average number of transmissions versus the number of
players N .
in the PMP scheme can encode all the IDNC combinations
and schedule a certain number of UDs, the PMP scheme
sacrifices the utility of the simultaneous transmissions by
considering only one transmission. Our proposed algorithm
strikes a balance between the aforementioned aspects by
jointly considering the number of scheduled UDs, their era-
sure probabilities, and the Has set size of each transmitting
UD. Despite the gain achieved by the partially-connected
D2D fog solution with the presence of a fog that executes the
whole process, our decentralized solution offers almost the
same completion time performance. This is due to the fact that
the centralized D2D fog and our proposed schemes consider
the same philosophy of D2D simultaneous transmissions.
We observe from Fig. 4 that, for a small number of play-
ers, the completion time performance of the PMP system is
close to both the CFG partially-connected D2D and FRAN
partially-connected D2D schemes. This is because, for a few
number of players (N ≤ 60), the certainty that the whole
frame M is distributed between players in the initial trans-
missions is low, thus decreasing the probability of deliver-
ing potential IDNC packets to UDs. This makes the overall
completion time performance of the partial D2D scenarios
close to the PMP scheme. As the number of players increases
(N ≥ 80), the bigger the certainty that the union of their Has
sets is equal to M . This results in delivering more potential
D2D IDNC packets, thus increasing the gap between the PMP
performance and both the FRAN partially-connected D2D
and proposed schemes.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate the average number of transmissions
versus the number of packets M for a network composed
of N = 30 UDs,  = 0.25, σ = 0.12, and connectivity
index C = 0.4. The figure shows that the proposed scheme
outperforms the fully connected, one coalition game, and
PMP schemes. For a few packets, the IDNC combinations
are limited, which affects the ability of the proposed scheme
to generate coded packets that satisfy many scheduled UDs.
With increasing the number of packets, the number of trans-
missions needed for the completion of the aforementioned
schemes is remarkably increasing. Therefore, as the num-
ber of packets increases, the proposed scheme substantially
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FIGURE 5. Average number of transmissions versus the number of
packets M.
FIGURE 6. Average number of transmissions versus the average
player-player erasure probability σ .
outperforms the fully connected and one coalition game
schemes.We see from Fig. 4 that the number of transmissions
of all schemes linearly increases with the number of packets.
This is expected as the number of packets increases, a high
number of transmissions is required for delivering all packets
to all UDs. This results in increasing the overall completion
time.
In Fig. 6, we plot the average number of transmissions
versus the average player-player erasure probability σ for a
network composed of N = 60, M = 30,  = 2σ , and
C = 0.4. Similar to what we have discussed in Figs. 4
and 5, the average number of transmissions of the partial
D2D schemes is noticeable compared to the fully-connected
D2D and OCF partially-connected D2D schemes, as shown
in Fig. 6. We clearly see that the number of required trans-
missions of the partial D2D schemes is less than the num-
ber of transmissions of the PMP scheme because of their
multiple UDs’ transmissions at each transmission slot. More-
over, as the player-to-player erasure probability increases, the
CP-UD erasure probability increases two-fold ( = 2σ ),
thus relatively affecting the completion time performance of
the PMP scheme. The partial D2D settings, however, benefit
from short D2D links, which provide much better UDs reach-
ability and packet successful delivery compared to the PMP
setting.
FIGURE 7. Average number of transmissions versus the connectivity
index C .
In Fig. 7, we investigate the average number of transmis-
sions versus the connectivity indexC for a network composed
of N = 60, M = 30,  = 0.25, and σ = 0.12. It can
clearly be seen that for a low connectivity index (C ≤
0.4), the proposed CFG partially-connected D2D scheme
noticeably outperforms the fully-connected D2D and OCF
partially-connected D2D schemes. In such poorly connected
networks (C ≤ 0.4), multiple simultaneous players’ trans-
missions are exploited in partially D2D algorithms. However,
as the connectivity index increases (C ≥ 0.6), the num-
ber of formed disjoint coalitions in our proposed solution
is drastically reduced, thus reducing the number of trans-
mitting UDs. This results in a performance agreement with
the fully-connected D2D scheme. Being independent of the
coverage zones of the transmitting UDs and the delay created
by those UDs, the PMP scheme is not affected by the changes
to C . Thus, the PMP scheme has a constant average number
of transmissions.
To conclude this section, we study the influence of the
setting σ = 0.5 on the number of transmissions of our
proposed scheme. In Table 3, we present the average number
of transmissions for different values of σ . The considered
network setup has 30 UDs, 20 packets,  = 0.5, andC = 0.1.
From Table 3, we notice that the performance of our proposed
solution still outperforms the PMP scheme for σ = 0.7 and
approximately offers the same performance as for the PMP
scheme for σ = 0.9. This is due to the simultaneous trans-
missions and cooperative decisions by the transmitting UDs,
which show the potential of the proposed CFG solution in
minimizing the number of required transmissions for packet
delivery.
C. PROPOSED CFG PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To quantify the analysis of the proposed formation coalition
solution, we plot in Fig. 8 the average number of coalitions
versus the number of players N for a network composed of
M = 30, a different connectivity index (C = 0.6, C = 0.3,
and C = 0.1), and σ = 0.12. Fig. 8 shows that the aver-
age coalition size increases with the increase in the number
of players. This is because, as N increases, the number of
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TABLE 3. The influence of changing σ on the average number of transmissions of the proposed scheme.
TABLE 4. Average run times of the different schemes.
TABLE 5. Average number of coalitions and split/merge rules of the proposed scheme in the first iteration.
FIGURE 8. Average number of coalitions versus the number of players N .
cooperating players increases, thus increasing the average
size of the formed coalitions. We can conclude from Fig. 8
that the resulting coalition structure 9fin from Algorithm 1
is composed of a small number of relatively large coalitions
when C = 0.6. When C = 0.1, this number of formed
coalitions increases, and the resulting coalition structure9fin
is composed of a large number of small coalitions’ sizes.
In Table 4, we evaluate the complexity of the proposed
coalition game solution as a function of the run time. In par-
ticular, Table 4 lists the consumed time of MATLAB to
execute all schemes in different network setups since starting
the algorithms until all players receive their wanted pack-
ets. The considered small network setup has 30 players, 20
packets,  = 0.5, σ = 0.25, and C = 0.1. The considered
large network setup has 100 players, 70 packets,  = 0.5,
σ = 0.25, and C = 0.1. It can clearly be seen from the
table that the proposed CFG-partially D2D scheme needs
low consumed time than all other solutions for both network
setups. Although the completion time achieved by the CFG
partially-connected D2D scheme is roughly the same as the
centralized FRAN partially-connected D2D, the computing
time required by our developed scheme is slightly higher than
that required by the FRAN partially-connected D2D. This is
because our proposed scheme needs time to converge before
generating the output. The centralized FRAN scheme has low
run time due to the presence of the fog unit.
To evaluate the convergence rate analysis of the proposed
scheme, the average number of merge-and-split rules before
Algorithm 1 converges to the final coalition structure is listed
in Table 5. To achieve the stable coalition with our proposed
CFG scheme, network setup 1 requires, on average 16 iter-
ations, and network setup 2 needs, on average 22 iterations.
These results show that our proposed distributed algorithm is
robust to different network setups. In summary, these results
show that our proposed algorithm allowsUDs to quickly form
converged and stable coalition structures, which confirms the
theoretical findings in Theorem 1.
Finally, some advantageous of our proposed scheme com-
pared to the one in [29] are given as follows. First, our
distributed and decentralized scheme offers almost the same
completion time performance of the centralized work in [29]
while offloading the fog unit. Such offloading policy will
allow the fog to serve more UDs. Second, our scheme allevi-
ates the required high power at UDs to deliver their channels’
status to the fog by using reliable and short D2D links. Third,
if some UDs move from one fog to another, their lost and
received content status have to be transferred to the new fog.
This requires implementing handover procedure at the fogs
which is not an issue in our distributed scheme as each UD
receives its requested packets from other nearby UDs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a distributed game-
theoretical framework for a partially connected D2D network
using coalition game and IDNC optimization. As such, the
distribution of contents among UDs is minimized. In particu-
lar, our proposedmodel is formulated as a coalition formation
game with non-transferable utility, and a fully distributed
coalition formation algorithm is proposed. The proposed dis-
tributed algorithm is converged to a Nash-stable coalition
structure using split-and-merge rules while accounting for the
altruistic players’ preferences. With such a distributed solu-
tion, each UD has to maintain a partial feedback matrix only
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for the UDs in its coverage zone instead of the global feed-
back matrix required in the fully connected D2D networks.
A comprehensive completion time and game performance
evaluations have been carried out for the proposed distributed
solution. In particular, our performance evaluation results
comprehensively demonstrated that the proposed distributed
solution offers almost the same completion time performance
similar to the centralized FRAN D2D network.
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